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REVELA TION AND THE BIBLE 
George I. Mavrodes 
Jesu, said to Peter, "Flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is 
in heaven," This looks like a noetic miracle which happened in (or to) Peter, 
Must all Christians have a comparable miracle in themselves, or does the Bible enable 
us to apprehend, in some "natural" way, the revelations made to prophets and apostles 
long ago? 
I suggest that we need not have a single answer to this question, and that the "mix" 
of revelation and reason, natural and supernatural noetic elements, may be different in 
various believers. 
If this paper were a sermon it would have two texts. One of them is from the 
Bible-mostly the words of Jesus, in fact-so that would be alright. But the 
other one is from David Hume. So maybe it is a good thing that this is not a 
sermon after all. 
I take the Hume text from the very end of his celebrated discussion of miracles, 
the section "Of Miracles" in the Enquiry. There he says: 
So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion 
not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot 
be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is 
insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by 
Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own 
person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives 
him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and 
experience. I 
The Biblical text is from the Gospel of Matthew: 
Now when Jesus came into the district of Caesarea Philippi, he asked 
his disciples, "Who do men say that the Son of man is?' And they said, 
"Some say John the Baptist, others say Elijah, and others Jeremiah or 
one of the prophets." He said to them, "But who do you say that I am?" 
Simon Peter replied, "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God." 
And Jesus answered him, "Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona! For flesh 
and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven."2 
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There are some very striking similarities between these two texts, all the more 
striking because they seem to come out of such different world-views. It is, of 
course, often suggested that the passage from Hume ought not to be taken at 
face value, and that it is really an ironic or sarcastic jibe at the irrationality and 
credulity of Christians. Maybe that is so. But in view of Jesus' words Christians 
might be well advised not to get their dander up over Hume's statement. Maybe 
what Hume thought was sarcasm is just the truth after all, or at least in the same 
ball-park as the truth of the Gospel. At any rate, I will here eschew any profession 
of doing Hume scholarship, or of expounding what was really in Hume's heart 
and mind. I will take these few sentences just as they stand. Anyone who wishes 
may construe my comments as referring to some fictional personage named 
"David Hume." 
The first similarity which strikes me is that both of these statements suggest 
that there is something unnatural about Christian faith. Or at least, if one objects 
to the word "unnatural," it is surely suggested that the characteristic elements 
of Christian faith are items which would not be accepted (or which in fact are 
not accepted) on what we might think of as ordinary grounds or in the ordinary 
way. "Mere reason," Hume says, "is insufficient to convince us of its veracity." 
And Jesus says to Peter, "flesh and blood has not revealed this to you." Presumably 
there are a lot of beliefs which we can acquire by mere reason, beliefs for which 
flesh and blood are sufficient. But not the beliefs which identify the Christian 
faith, beliefs such as that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God. That 
requires something special. 
What is that special thing? Both Hume and Jesus suggest that it is a special 
act of God. Jesus says that it was the heavenly Father who revealed to Peter the 
truth about Jesus. And Hume says that whoever assents to the Christian faith is 
moved to do so by a miracle-apparently not by the evidence of a miracle but 
rather by the effect of a miracle which "gives him a determination to believe."3 
Furthermore, both Hume and Jesus explicitly locate the special divine act in 
the person who has the Christian belief. Hume does not say that a person comes 
to belief as the (possibly remote) effect of a miracle somewhere. He says instead 
that whoever assents to the Christian faith is the subject of "a continued miracle 
in his own person." In a similar way, Jesus is not satisfied with suggesting that 
Peter's faith must be derived from a divine revelation somewhere, to someone. 
No, he says to Peter that the heavenly Father has revealed this "to you." 
Now, I expect to return to all these similarities in the course of this discussion. 
But there is also an important difference between these two texts, a difference 
which I have so far partially obscured. I want now to bring that difference also 
into the open. Hume, following a custom common among philosophers, puts 
his claim as a generalization, in this case a universal generalization. He puts 
forward a thesis about "any reasonable person" and about "whoever is moved 
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by Faith" (my emphasis). Jesus' statement, on the other hand, has no generali-
zation in it at all. It is a singular statement, spoken to a particular man, Simon 
Peter, who is addressed with the personal pronoun "you." And much of this 
paper is concerned with the question of whether we should construe Jesus' 
statement to Peter as being generalizable to all believers. 
We can also put the question in this way. Peter's "confession" was that Jesus 
is the Christ, the Son of the living God. It appears that many Christians have 
shared that faith and that confession with Peter through the centuries which have 
followed. No doubt many readers of this paper will think of themselves, as I 
think of myself, as joining Peter in this profession of faith. But how shall we 
think of Jesus' response? Would Jesus say to us, as He said to Peter, that this 
has not been revealed to us by flesh and blood but by the heavenly Father? Or 
is our epistemic situation somehow deeply different from that of Peter? 
This question, it seems to me, is among the most important which we can 
consider in the field of Christian epistemology. 
Now, there are of course a variety of ways in which our situation here in the 
20th century differs from that of Peter in the first century A.D. Perhaps most 
prominently, Peter spent two or three years as a close associate of Jesus, an 
eye-witness of the physical, bodily, presence of the Son of God. We are not in 
that situation ourselves. How does that contrast bear on our question? 
When we think of this contrast it is natural to think of the things which Peter 
could do and we cannot do. He could see Jesus, in the most literal and straightfor-
ward sense of "see." He could look around and see whether Jesus was in the 
house, in the boat. He could put out his hand and grip Jesus by the arm. He 
could listen to Jesus speaking, perhaps paying special attention to the tone of 
his voice, noticing whether Jesus sounded tired, or sorrowful. And so on. But 
all of the things we are likely to think of along this line seem to be perfectly 
natural activities, the exercise of natural human powers (if there are any such 
powers at all). It looks as though what Peter could do better than we can 
do---perhaps what we cannot do at all-is to have a natural cognitive contact 
with Jesus. He was in the right position for that. If there was ever anyone who 
could have a natural knowledge of Jesus, and in the most direct way, then Peter 
would seem to be a leading candidate. 
In his reply to Peter's confession, however, Jesus seems to say that the knowl-
edge embodied in that confession was not derived in a natural way. His denial 
singles out one natural way of acquiring information, the testimony of "flesh 
and blood." Perhaps we can read that as intended to cover the other natural 
modes also. At any rate, the positive part of Jesus' reply attributes Peter's faith 
to a divine act, a revelation from the heavenly Father. No doubt Peter could 
identify Jesus as a Galilean by noticing his Galilean accent. No doubt he some-
times learned that Jesus had gone into town by being told so by one of the other 
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disciples. But Peter did not learn that Jesus was the Christ in any such way as 
these, at least if Jesus' own account of the matter is correct. Acquiring that 
belief involves something importantly different. Perhaps we, in the 20th century, 
are pretty much in the same situation, noetically, as Peter. 
We can also, however, think of some things which we can do and which Peter 
could not do. We can, for one thing, look back on 2,000 years of church history, 
of Christian experience and testimony, of theological and philosophical reflection 
on the Christian faith, and so on. We can, that is, appeal to a lot more "flesh 
and blood" than was available to Peter. And that may suggest that it is possible 
for us to acquire a natural knowledge of the incarnation of the Son, even if that 
was not possible for Peter. 
There is, however, another interesting-and perhaps more important-thing 
which we can do and which Peter could not do. We can read, in the Bible, that 
Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God. We can read it, for example, in 
the passage which I quoted at the beginning of this paper. But Peter could not 
do that at the time of his confession, because the relevant parts of the Bible had 
not yet been written. The Bible has played an important role in Christian life 
and thought throughout most of the history of the Church. That is a role, however, 
which it could not play in the lives of the original disciples of Jesus and of the 
early converts to the Christian faith. How does the fact that we have the Bible, 
and in particular the New Testament, while Peter did not have it. bear on our 
question? 
That question, we remember, is whether Jesus' statement to Peter can properly 
be generalized, whether we should think of Jesus saying the same thing to us 
that he said to Peter. We should beware, however, of construing this issue too 
broadly. Jesus said that Peter's faith was generated by a divine revelation to 
him, but he said nothing at all about the mode of that revelation, about the "how" 
of it. And he said nothing at all about the phenomenology of that revelation, of 
the "feel" of it to Peter-nor indeed about whether it had any special feel at all. 4 
If Jesus were to say to us, then, just what he said to Peter, his statement to us 
would imply nothing about whether the mode of the revelation to us was the 
same as the mode of Peter's revelation. But it would, I think, commit him to 
the claim that there was a divine revelation to us, as well as to Peter. 
But would such a claim be true? Or is it rather the case that the Bible is a 
substitute for revelation. so that we (having the Bible at hand) can acquire the 
Christian faith without needing a revelation while Peter (not having the relevant 
parts of the Bible) could not recognize the deity of Jesus without a special divine 
act? I think that Christians have often adopted an epistemic "scenario" involving 
the Bible which does, in effect, make the Bible a substitute for revelation in just 
this way. 
For the most part, such scenarios do not reject the idea of revelation entirely, 
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and they do not hold that the Bible was, or could have been, produced without 
divine revelation. 5 The idea is rather that the Bible enables me now to get along 
as a Christian without a revelation to me, without (as Hume would put it) "a 
continued miracle in my own person." I can (and must) make do with someone 
else's revelation. 
This position has indeed a certain attractiveness. If I adopt it, then I need not 
assimilate my own meager Christian experience to that of Peter, and thus I need 
not seem to put myself "on the same level" as the most outstanding saints of 
God. And while I must continue to hold that there have been divine noetic 
interventions somewhere in the history of the world, I need not claim any such 
bizarre experience for myself. I need not profess that God speaks to me, for 
such things belong to a time long past and to a few select people who are now 
safely beyond the reach of our psychiatrists. Gordon Clark once put it like this: 
Of course God's speech to Moses was revelation, in fact, revelation 
par excellence, if you wish. But we are not Moses. Therefore, if the 
problem is to explain how we know in this age, one cannot use the 
personal experience of Moses. Today we have the Scripture ..... . 
What God said to Moses is written down in the Bible; the words are 
identical; the revelation is the same. 6 
The scenarios I'm thinking about go roughly as follows. A long time ago ("in 
biblical times") God revealed Himself, His will and commandments, some divine 
mysteries, etc., to prophets and apostles. These people wrote out their accounts 
of these revelations (perhaps under the impetus and guidance of another divine 
gift, inspiration). These writings were eventually collected together in the Bible, 
and they have been preserved and transmitted to us. The Bible comes now into 
our hands in some ordinary way---e.g., we buy it in a book store. We read it 
and think about it by the exercise of ordinary human capacities. And, according 
to our judgment, we may come to believe what is said there about God, Jesus, 
the human condition and human destiny, and other such matters. Thus we can 
now avail ourselves of the content of what was long ago revealed to Peter and 
other prophets and apostles. We can share their beliefs without sharing their 
experiences. In particular, we need not share whatever experiences of theirs 
constituted the divine revelation to them, and we need not have any different 
revelatory experiences of our own. We are in radically different epistemic cir-
cumstances. 
A philosophical version of this scenario is provided by John Locke. He says 
that "revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communi-
cated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony 
and proofs it gives that they come from God. "7 A little earlier, contrasting faith 
and reason, he had said: "Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, 
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not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer 
as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way 
of discovering truths to men we call revelation."8 
What seems clear in the first statement is that the acceptance of the content 
of revelation depends upon reason. Locke reiterates this point later in the same 
chapter: "I do not mean that we must consult reason and examine whether a 
proposition revealed from God can be made out by natural principles, and if it 
cannot, that then we may reject it; but consult it we must, and by it examine 
whether it be a revelation from God or no; and if reason finds it to be revealed 
from God, reason then declares for it as much as for any other truth, and makes 
it one of her dictates."9 That is, the proper acceptance of any revealed truth, p, 
depends on a judgment that p has been revealed by God. But once we have that 
judgment, there appears to Locke nothing remarkable in our acceptance of p. 
For Locke has the principle that God can neither deceive nor be deceived, and 
that therefore whatever is revealed by God is true. This principle, however, 
along with the judgment that p has been revealed by God, entails that p is true. 
And having this argument that p is true, we go on in a perfectly natural and 
ordinary way to accept p--"reason then declares for it as much as for any other 
truth, and makes it one of her dictates." 
John Baillie, the 20th century philosopher-theologian, puts forward a sharply 
contrasting scenario, largely in terms of a personal testimony. 
What I must do is ask myself how the knowledge of God first came to 
me .... Unless my analysis of my memory is altogether at fault, the 
knowledge of God first came to me in the form of an awareness that I 
was 'not my own' but one under authority .... I cannot remember a 
time when I did not know that my parents and their household were 
part of a wider community which was under the same single authority. 
Nor again, can I recall a time when I did not know that this authority 
was closely bound up with, and indeed seemed to emanate from, a 
certain story. As far back as I can remember anything, my parents and 
nurses were already speaking to me of Abraham and Isaac and ... of 
the culmination of the story in the coming of Jesus Christ .... It was, 
then, through the media of my boyhood's home, the Christian community 
of which it formed a part, and the 'old, old story' from which that 
community drew its life, that God first revealed Himself to me. This 
is simple matter of fact. But what I take to be matter of fact in it is not 
only that God used these media but that in using them He actually did 
reveal Himself to my soul . . . . That God should have revealed Himself 
to certain men of long ago could not in itself be of concern to me 
now ... What is it to me that God should have commanded David to 
404 Faith and Philosophy 
do this or that, or called Paul to such and such a task? It is nothing at 
all, unless it should happen that, as I read of His calling and commanding 
them, I at the same time found Him calling and commanding me. If 
the word of God is to concern me, it must be a word addressed to me 
individually ... II) 
In the Baillie scenario, the Bible is not a substitute for revelation; it is rather 
one of the "media" of revelation. In Baillie's view, the Bible does not permit 
him to get along without having a revelation himself. Instead, it enables him to 
have just such a revelation. And Baillie seems deliberately to assimilate his own 
experience to that of the biblical saints, rather than contrasting those experiences. 
"We are not Moses," Gordon Clark said. But here it is said that just as God 
commanded David and Paul, so also does He command John Baillie. Baillie 
seems to think of his own epistemic circumstances, vis a vis religious matters, 
as being not much different from that of the biblical heroes of the faith. 
It certainly looks therefore, as though Baillie should have little difficulty with 
the Humean passage which I quoted earlier. He professes to be "conscious" (to 
use Hume's terminology) of a divine noetic intervention is his own life, a 
revelation addressed to him "individually." And he makes no profession of having 
determined the truth of the Christian religion by "mere reason." It seems rather 
to be the divine revelation, addressed to him individually, which has given him 
a "determination" to believe. 
We should also expect Baillie to think that Jesus' words, addressed originally 
to Peter, apply equally well to him. God, he says, "actually did reveal Himself 
to my soul." And he seems to think that this is what happens to anyone who is 
a believer at all. 11 Presumably he would accept the universal generalization of 
Jesus' response to Peter's confession. 
Anyone who adopts a position such as that of Baillie will no doubt face an 
immediate objection. Baillie gives us his testimony about "how the knowledge 
of God first came to me." But even if we do not doubt the sincerity of his 
account we are not bound to accept its truth. We can be mistaken about many 
features of our own biographies, even about the time and place of our own birth. 
Perhaps Baillie was mistaken about his own noetic and spiritual biography, and 
about the birth of his faith. He says that it is a "simple matter of fact" that God 
spoke to him personally. Perhaps, however, that is not a fact at all, but only 
Baillie's misreading of the situation. 
It is useful, I think, to distinguish two versions of this general sort of objection. 
One sort of objection might be called "globaL" Objections of this sort would be 
raised against any revelation claims, regardless of who made them or of who 
they were made about. It would be plausible for an atheist, for example, to reject 
Baillie's testimony about God's revelation of Himself to him. But the atheist 
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would presumably reject in the same way any claim that Moses or Paul had been 
the recipients of a divine revelation. If there is no God, and never has been, 
then God has never revealed anything to anyone-neither to Moses, nor to Paul, 
nor to John Baillie. Atheism provides a ground, or an apparent ground, for the 
global rejection of revelation claims. And so also would any theory of the divine 
nature which entailed that God, even if He exists, is either unable or unwilling 
to communicate with human beings. 
"Local" objectors, however, reject some revelation claims without rejecting 
others. The Westminster Confession of Faith, for example, says, 
... it pleased the Lord, at sundry times, and in divers manners, to 
reveal himself, and to declare that his will unto his Church; and after-
wards, for the better preserving and propagating of the truth, and for 
the more sure establishment and comfort of the Church against the 
corruption of the flesh, and malice of Satan and of the world, to commit 
the same wholly unto writing: which maketh the holy Scripture to be 
most necessary; those former ways of God's revealing his will unto his 
people being now ceased. 12 
Someone who accepted Westminster might (depending on how they interpreted 
the last clause quoted above) reject Baillie's account of his own faith without 
rejecting the claim that God had spoken to Moses and to Paul. Baillie, they 
might say, just lived in the wrong time-he was born two thousand years too 
late for his account to be true. Gordon Clark would seem to be just such a 
thinker, and he has a lot of sympathizers. 
Local objectors, however, cannot very well make common cause with global 
objectors. For the bases of global objections count just as much against what 
the local objectors want to accept as against what they want to reject. Local 
objectors must find their own independent bases for their objections to someone 
such as Baillie. 
I, of course, reject the global objections to a divine revelation. I think that I 
could not be a Christian unless I believed that there was a revelation, a divine 
self-disclosure, somewhere in the history of the world. I do not accept the atheist 
reading of reality, nor do I think that God is unable or unwilling to communicate 
with human beings. But here I will be content with merely asserting these things, 
without exploring or supporting them further. 
I suppose that local objections have more chance with me. The fathers of 
Westminster described the former ways of God's revelation as "being now 
ceased." Why should we suppose that they have ceased? Reasons for this, it 
seems to me, fall again roughly into two categories-theological and experiential. 
The theological reasons assert it to be a revealed truth itself that the divine mode 
of action in the world has changed, that revelation ceased with the end of the 
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apostolic age, or some such thing. Experiential reasons assert that we simply 
find, as a matter of fact, that the sort of thing that happened to Moses and to 
Paul does not happen to anyone today. 
In my opinion the theological reasons are inconclusive at best, and probably 
that is to treat them too generously. But about them too I will say no more here. 
Against the experiential reasons, however, there stands a strong counter-claim. 
And that is that there are testimonies, and have been through the history of the 
church, that essentially the same sort of thing which happened to Moses and 
Paul does continue to happen. There is, for example, the testimony of John 
Baillie, just quoted. 
Of course, what Baillie says about himself is not bound thereby to be true. 
On the other hand, it is an apparently sincere testimony of a thoughtful man 
about what happened to himself, about his own spiritual experience. Such a 
testimony, we might say, makes a sort of prima facie case. Unless we have 
some strong positive reason against it, it would seem that we should count it as 
a live and legitimate possibility. (I hope to argue soon that the conviction that 
it didn't happen that way to me is not a positive reason for my rejecting Baillie's 
testimony.) And, of course, there may well be some of us who find Baillie's 
account illuminating for our own experience, as that experience appears to us, 
and who will therefore feel themselves to have an additional reason for accepting 
something like Baillie's account. In the face of testimonies like these, it seems 
to me to be rash (to say the least) to assert that we know that such things do not 
happen today. 
If a Christian does not accept something like Baillie's account of his or her 
own spiritual knowledge and faith, then what alternative is open? I suppose that 
the most plausible alternative is some version of that proposed by Locke. The 
noetic miracle, the divine revelation, happened in some other time and place, 
but the noetic content of that miracle has been preserved and transmitted, most 
notably in the Bible. By some rational process we determine that this content 
was indeed revealed by God. And therefore (having a powerful confidence in 
the veracity of God) we go on to accept the substance of that content itself. 
Against this alternative Baillie seems to have two complaints. First, he claims 
that the content which is thus transmitted is not particularized enough to the 
specificities of his own circumstances to serve his own spiritual needs. He can 
read about what God commanded Abraham to do, and David, and Paul, 
and ... But Baillie wants to know what God commands him to do, hic et nunc. 13 
He wants to know what to do about his son (if he has a son), whether he is to 
go as a missionary, and so on. And information of that specificity, about him, 
is not contained in the biblical texts. 
Second, Baillie claims that unless God speaks to him personally he cannot 
determine whether God really did reveal Himself to the Biblical authors and 
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heroes. 14 After all, he says, the alleged biblical revelations happened a long time 
ago. How are we supposed to determine now, twenty or thirty centuries later, 
that those things really did happen as they are described? Just what is that rational 
process after all, the one I referred to a few paragraphs back? 
This question of Baillie's seems to me to be really important, and one which 
Christians ought to face for themselves, regardless of whether they feel like 
replying to the challenges of unbelievers. I propose to set aside, temporarily, 
Baillie's first complaint in order to explore this one a little more fully. 
Locke, it seems to me, treats this sort of question in a curiously casual way. 
He says that God authenticates His revelations with "marks which reason cannot 
be mistaken in. "15 Unfortunately, he isn't explicit about what infallible marks 
we can look for at the present time. The biblical characters themselves, he says, 
did not rely solely on any internal conviction or feeling for their judgment that 
they were the recipients of a divine revelation. No, they had better evidence, 
external evidence available to sense perception, in form of miraculous signs. 
And he cites the experience of Moses and of Gideon. Thus they had reason for 
their judgment that God was speaking to them. 16 
Well, perhaps Moses and Gideon did have reason in this way. Maybe the 
sense experience of a burning bush or of a sheepskin wet with dew is stronger, 
epistemically, than any non-sensory experience (though why that should be, I 
don't know). But even so, how could that help me now? Of course, if I could 
now see a burning bush myself, a bush which was not consumed, and if that 
miracle was plausibly linked in some way with the Bible, then maybe I would 
have reason to believe that the Bible was inspired, reliable, authoritative, and 
so on. But if that were so, then it would seem that Locke and Clark and the 
fathers of Westminster would be mistaken. I would be in much the same epistemic 
position as Moses. I would have essentially the same sort of reason for accepting 
the revealed content as he had-i.e., a miraculous sign from God. And it would 
tum out to be Hume, or someone not far from Hume, who was right after all 
about Christian epistemology. 
Alternatively, if I knew that Moses had seen genuine divine miracles then I 
might have reason to believe that Moses was the recipient of genuine divine 
revelations, and that could give me at least a start on a confidence in the Bible 
as the repository of revealed content. But that doesn't seem to be very helpful. 
For the problem of detern1ining that Moses really was a witness of genuine divine 
miracles seems to be much the same as the problem of detern1ining that he 
received genuine revelations. The Mosaic miracles, just like the revelations, 
happened a long time ago if they happened at all. It is not at all clear that I now 
have any access to them by way of ordinary reason. 
The Westminster Confession seems also to address something similar to Bail-
lie's problem, and perhaps more realistically than Locke. We read there that 
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We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an 
high and reverent esteem of the holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of 
the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the 
consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all 
glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's 
salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire 
perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence 
itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion 
and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is 
from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with 
the Word in our hearts. 17 
This passage begins by reciting a body of evidence for the special character 
of the Bible. These "arguments" might well be thought to belong to the field of 
natural human reason, or (in Jesus' words) to the domain of flesh and blood. 
But it is pretty clear that the fathers of Westminster did not think of these 
arguments as being the bottom line in Christian epistemology. No, that role 
seems to belong to something quite different, the "inward work" of the Holy 
Spirit. The whole paragraph, in fact, has a decidedly Humean flavor about it. 
No doubt Westminster is more sanguine about the evidences than was Hume. 
But it seems to share with Hume the realization that these evidences are not 
sufficient to generate and sustain Christian faith. That must be done by a special 
"inward work" of a divine agent "in our hearts." Would not Hume recognize in 
this passage his own description of the believer who "is conscious of a continued 
miracle in his own person"?'R 
How would Westminster cohere with Baillie? There are at least two interpre-
tations of the content of the assurance mentioned by Westminster. We can think, 
on the one hand, of a person who reads one thing after another in the Bible, 
and who is assured (by the work of the Holy Spirit) of the truth and authority 
of each doctrine, command, etc., as he reads it. Alternatively, however, we can 
think of a person in whom the Spirit generates an assurance of some general 
thesis about the Bible-that it is infallibly true, or authoritative, or some such 
thing. Such a person might then go on to rely on particular biblical pronounce-
ments without the need for any further special divine action. 
The first of these interpretations, it seems to me, fits quite well with Baillie's 
testimony, if we continue to ignore, for the moment, Baillie's concern with 
specificity. To whatever extent the content of what is revealed to Baillie is a 
content which can be found in the Bible itself, this interpretation provides a 
model for the claim that God really does reveal Himself "to my soul," but through 
the medium of the "old, old story." 
The second interpretation fits less well. It recognizes, indeed, that there is 
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something which is revealed directly to me. But that something might tum out 
to be only a single piece of information, a generalization about the reliability or 
authority of the Bible. Everything else which is revealed at all might be revealed 
to other people long ago, and not to me at all. I would have only the report of 
these revelations, along with a principle which would justify me in accepting 
these reports as true. But that scenario would seem to lack most of the directness 
of the divine communication which Baillie stresses so much. 
While the scenario embodied in the second interpretation would not seem 
attractive to someone like Baillie it may well have been attractive to the fathers 
of Westminster. At any rate, it seems to me the most natural reading of the 
Westminster text. I said earlier that Baillie appears to give us a sincere testimony 
about his own experience. Might we also think of Westminster as fundamentally 
testimonial, the testimony of the divines (or the preponderance of them) who 
drew up this document? Does it also make a prima facie case? 
Here I want to suggest a sort of cognitive strategy. Suppose that we consciously 
and deliberately set aside the assumption that we must have a single epistemology 
which shall account for every case of Christian faith. Instead, we will recognize 
the possibility of "different strokes for different folks," including different divine 
strokes for different folks within the single household of faith. And after all, 
why shouldn't we set aside the universalistic assumption? Why should we suppose 
that the divine approach to each person must follow a single pattern? 
Setting aside that assumption amounts to taking seriously the difference which 
I noted early in this paper, the difference between Jesus' statement and that of 
Hume. Hume's is a universal generalization, while that of Jesus is a singular 
statement addressed to a particular man, Simon Peter. Perhaps the truth is not 
that Jesus' statement should be generalized but rather that Hume's should be 
particularized. On this reading, we would say that Hume may well be right about 
some people-about Peter, for example. But perhaps he is not right about 
everyone. 
And why should not both John Baillie and Westminster be right, even on the 
second interpretation of the latter? Of course, on this conjecture neither Baillie 
nor Westminster could be right about everything. For both of them appear to 
generalize their views to cover the genesis and maintenance of all Christian faith. 
But while Baillie's account of his own experience can be construed as a testimony, 
surely his extension of that account to the whole household of faith cannot be 
a testimony. That must be a theory, a theory which could be mistaken cven if 
the testimony is true. And similarly for the fathers of Westminster. So there 
might be some people who, armed with a general principle about the reliability 
and authority of the Bible, proceed from there by the ordinary canons of reason. 
And there might bc others who find each particular element in their faith much 
more directly given to them by a special divine grace. 
410 Faith and Philosophy 
We might say a similar thing about the specificity which seemed so important 
to Baillie. It certainly seems plausible to suppose that if God really did command 
a certain woman to go as a missionary to Peru (and not to Brazil) then that 
command could not have been derived by any ordinary rational process from 
the text of the Bible. It looks as though that must have been a divine command 
addressed individually to her. But perhaps not every Christian is the recipient 
of a divine command of that specificity. Perhaps, that is, there are Christians to 
whom God gives only those commands which are rather general and which are 
to be found in the biblical text. God does not command them to take up one 
line of work rather than another, to live in one city rather than another, and so 
on. Those Christians would not need a specificity which requires a special word 
addressed to them. And that is not to deny that there are others for whom such 
a specificity is essential. 
Perhaps the most radical question along this line would be this. Might there 
be a Christian to whom nothing is divinely revealed, neither the particular tenets 
of the faith, nor a general thesis about the Bible, nor a specific command for 
his life, etc.? Put in the Westminster terms, this would be a Christian in whom 
there was no "inward work" of the Holy Spirit at all---or, more carefully, no 
inward work of the Spirit which had a noetic effect. Perhaps such a person is 
simply "moved and induced by the testimony of the Church," in a perfectly 
natural way, either to accept various features of the faith or to accept some 
general principle about the Bible. Or perhaps he just works through the "arguments 
whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God," using nothing 
but ordinary human faculties. Could such a person be a Christian? 
I must confess that I find a resistance in myself against this suggestion. But 
I cannot think now of a strong reason against it. Perhaps it too is a possibility 
which we should countenance. 
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